A Note on the Role of Equity in the Curriculum of the Modern Law School by Tefft, Sheldon
A NOTE ON THE ROLE OF EQUITY IN
THE CURRICULUM OF THE MODERN
LAW SCHOOL
SHELDON TEFFT*
One of the casualties of the generally beneficial merger of law and
equity has been the abandonment by law schools of courses treat-
ing equitable relief. The author of this article perceives an in-
creasing -need for curriculum changes which will restore this neg-
lected subject to its proper role in the education of the lawyer.
T HREE-QUARTERS of a century ago Professor Frederic W.
Maitland, perhaps in an attempt to discourage the students at
Cambridge from attending his lectures on equity, told them that,
because law and equity had been merged by the Judicature Acts of
18731 and 1875,2 the Faculty Board of that venerable university had
voted to drop equity from the list of subjects which were required for
its degree in law and that he approved the change:
I have no doubt however that we did the right thing. To have
acknowledged the existence of equity as a system distinct from
law would in my opinion have been a belated, reactionary mea-
sure.3
Though Professor Maitland continued to lecture on equity until
his untimely death in 1906 and though shortly thereafter his lectures
were published by the Cambridge University Press,4 equity did not
have a place as a separate subject at Cambridge until 1962 when its
Faculty Board re-introduced a paper on equity as an option in the
newly-revised Cambridge curriculum in law.6
In contrast, the Law Faculty at Oxford, perhaps as a belated effort
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to atone for the failure of its first Vinerian Professor, Sir William
Blackstone, to have done justice to equity0 or perhaps only because
of its traditional policy of embracing lost causes, continued even
after the Judicature Acts to include, and indeed still does include,
equity as one of the subjects that are required for the degree of
Bachelor of Civil Law.7 Sir William S. Holdsworth, the Vinerian
Professor from 1922 to 1944, and Professor Harold G. Hanbury,8 who
held the chair from 1949 to 1964, were enthusiastic exponents of
separate courses in equity. Sir William detested the attempt to
teach equity in snippets. 9 In a survey for the golden jubilee of the
Law Quarterly Review he reported, apparently with great satisfac-
tion, that in England during the preceding fifty years the study of
equity had flourished and concluded his contribution with the senti-
ment: "May it continue to flourish."'10
In the United States more than sixty years ago Dean Roscoe
Pound of the University of Nebraska warned the Bar that because
of the merger of law and equity under the codes there was grave
danger that, unless lawyers were vigilant, much equity would be
lost." In a stirring and yet scholarly paper presented to the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools in 1933, Professor Percy Bordwell of
Iowa called upon the faculties of American Law Schools to take the
offensive and fight for equity-not to restore the conditions of the
past-not to campaign for separate courts with separate procedures,
or even for separate courses, but rather for a militant equity-one
that would protect the ethical tone, characteristic of equity at its
best, and thus would preserve its historic role as the forward ele-
ment of the Anglo-American legal system.
12
But what are those fundamental institutions which must be
nurtured and sheltered if the historic role of equity is to be pre-
6 See Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 HARV. L. Rnv. 1 (1929).7 See Harris, Changes in the B.C.L. Syllabus at Oxford, 6 J. Sod'y PUB. TEACHERS
L. 121-22 (1961).
8 See HANBURY, ESSAYS IN EQUrrY 55-68 (1934); HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY (8th ed.
1962) (first edition published in 1935).
9 Holdsworth, Equity, 51 L.Q. REv. 142, 161 (1935).
10 Ibid.
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12 BordwelI, The Resurgance of Equity, 1 U. CHl. L. REv. 741 (1934). See also
COOK, THE PLACE OF EQUITY IN OUR LEGAL SYsTEM 77 (Proceedings, Twelfth Annual
Meeting, Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, 1912); McCuNTOCK, EQUrrY 18-19 (1936); Orfield,
The Place of Equity in the Law School Curriculum, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 26 (1949).
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served? When Anglo-American lawyers think of equity they are
likely to think of institutions of substantive law, such as the trust, the
equity of redemption, and the restrictive covenant created by the
chancellors with little or no help from legislatures and by means of
which large and important segments of the Anglo-American legal
system have been revolutionized. But valuable as equity's contribu-
tions to substantive law have been, they are dwarfed in importance,
either from the point of view of legal theory, or from the point of
view of the practical affairs of the modern world, by the all-pervasive
principle of the chancellor that specific relief should be decreed in
any case in which the court is persuaded that such relief is feasible
and that it is both important and "equitable" that such relief be
available. To make this principle effective, the chancellor had
devised the decree in personam-an order to which the Great Seal
was attached-directing a party either to act or to refrain from acting,
or both, as the "equities" of the situation required. It is this device
-the decree in personam, drafted to fit the particular case and made
effective by the threat that one who disobeys it will be punished for
contempt of court-rather than rules of substantive law, that consti-
tutes the really important contribution of equity to the Anglo-
American legal system.
Fortunately, the abolition of the separate courts of law and
equity and the adoption of a unified procedure did not and were
not intended either to curb or to abolish the power of courts to
afford specific relief. Rather, the principle that society should and
will afford such relief flourishes in the United States today as never
before in the history of the Anglo-American legal system.13 Indeed,
perhaps the most important development in the law of the United
States during the two decades of the atomic age has been the re-
markable extension of specific relief-to be achieved by decrees in
personam-for the protection of individuals and society from threat-
ened conduct that is deemed to be unlawful.
14
During this period there has been a tremendous and at times
23 Compare, however, statutes such as the Norris-La Guardia Act §§ 1-15, 47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1964), and decisions such as Shelley v. Kraemer, 384
U.S. 1 (1948).
14 See, e.g., Hughley v. City of Opelika, 251 F. Supp. 566, 569 (M.D. Ala. 1965);
Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1006-09 (N.D. Cal. 1965); McMeans v.
Mayor's Court, 247 F. Supp. 606, 610 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F.
Supp. 100, 110 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (Selma March Case). For additional illustrations see
notes 16-24 infra.
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an almost overwhelming surge of specific relief. Many of the classic
restrictions that had limited the availability of such relief fairly
narrowly have been cast aside-perhaps, as some believe, too many
by far.15 The particulars of this surge are numerous, varied, and
striking. They include developments as diverse as the doctrine of
the "void but non-frivolous decree,"'16 the Uniform Commercial
Code,17 and the so-called "Long Arm Statutes";' 8 and as far reaching
as the segregation cases, 19 the Civil Rights Acts of 1957,20 1960,21 and
1964,22 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,23 the reapportionment cases,
24
and many more. Though specific relief has not displaced and, of
course, never will displace judgments for damages, decrees in per-
sonam are no longer confined to a relatively few branches of the
legal system that tend to be the province of a small group of experts
who specialize in chancery matters.
If the challenges of the space age are to be met and if the objec-
tives highly valued in society today are to be attained, lawyers
generally, as well as those who specialize in chancery matters, must
have a thorough, enlightened knowledge of the remedy of specific
relief, achieved through decrees in personam, as an instrument for
the administration of justice. It is imperative, therefore, that the
program of the modern law school include a comprehensive study
of the procedures by which judicial power may be used to afford
25 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 583, 589-682 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 330-49
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT.
REV. 252; BICKEL, PoLrrICs AN THE WARREN COURT (1965); Kurland, "Equal in Origin
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78
HARv. L. Rav. 143 (1964); Note, 65 MICH. L. REV. 556 (1967) (noting Lance v. Plum-
mer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966)). Compare Stevens,
A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles and Remedies, 41 CoREaLL L.Q. 351
(1956).
18 See Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CH. L. REv. 86 (1948).
2 UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716.
8 8 Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
19 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122
(5th Cir.), aff"d, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
20 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C. (1964)).
21 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C. (1964)).
22 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C. (1964)).
22 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1978a-p (Supp. I, 1965).
24.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962).
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specific relief. With few exceptions25 those procedures were de-
veloped by courts of equity and, even under modem codes, are
commonly described as equitable. The effectiveness of that remedy
depends primarily upon the "equitable" characteristics of those pro-
cedures-their flexibility and speed and the opportunity that they
afford for the exercise of judicial discretion to mould the proceedings
to fit the peculiar requirements of individual cases. 26
Such study, if it is to be adequate, must illuminate the role of
specific relief not only in the traditional fields of contracts and prop-
erty, but also in many other branches of the law including, of course,
those of constitutional and criminal law. It must encompass inter-
locutory relief as well as relief that is granted after a trial on the
merits. The study should show how specific relief can be enforced
not only in the simple vendor-purchaser cases, but also in the more
difficult situations such as those in which performance extending over
a period of time will be required 27 or in which the line that separates
activity which is lawful from that which is unlawful is difficult
to determine and is, at best, vague and imprecise.28  It should ex-
plain the technique of the "experimental" decree 29 and the power
that courts have either to modify or to dissolve a decree-whether
temporary or permanent-in the light of experience gained from
"living with the decree" or of changes which have occurred since
the decree was issued.30 It is important, too, that such factors as
mistake, hardship, fairness, "clean hands," laches, and "equitable
terms" not be slighted.
Moreover, since specific relief is now undertaken in many con-
troversies that are highly charged with emotions, the difficult prob-
25 The principal exception is ejectment.
28 Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. R1v. 97 (1918). See Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161
F.2d 499, 500 (1947) (Frank, J.).
27 See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). Subsequent Supreme Court con-
siderations of the dispute, which is still pending, appear at 281 U.S. 179 (1980), 281
U.S. 696 (1980), 309 U.S. 569 (1940), 809 U.S. 636 (1940), 311 U.S. 107 (1940), 818 U.S.
547 (1941), 85 US. 996 (1967).
26 See, e.g., Gelfand v. O'Haver, 3 Cal. 2d 218, 200 P.2d 790 (1948); Five Oaks
Corp. v. Gathmann, 190 Md. 348, 58 A.2d 656 (1948); Washington Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. Albrecht, 157 Md. 889, 146 At. 233 (1929).
29 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 867 (1929) (subsequent history traced in
note 27 supra); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 280 (1907), 287 U.S. 678
(1915), 237 U.S. 474 (1915), 240 U.S. 650 (1916).
"0 See Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 75 Neb. 85, 106 N.W. 429 (1905), aff'd
on rehearing, 75 Neb. 100, 108 N.W. 978 (1906); Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 AtI.
699 (1950).
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lems encountered when a recalcitrant defendant flaunts a decree of
specific relief must be stressed.31  All in all, the problems would
seem to be sufficiently numerous, challenging, and important to
justify separate coherent and comprehensive treatment.3 2  Whether
the vehicle for such treatment is a course entitled "equity" is rela-
tively unimportant. Conceivably, some may wish to fit the study
into a general course on procedure. Perhaps the place of the study
in a particular school will reflect the idiosyncrasies of its faculty.
Such matters are, of themselves, insignificant details. What is im-
portant is that the students master specific relief as a remedy for
the protection of individuals and society from theatened conduct
which is unlawful. For only if this is done can they be prepared for
the challenges of the space age. And so it is that the sentiment of
the author of The Practical Register in Chancery that "justice
and equity, and the lovers of them, may forever flourish" 33 is as
appropriate today as it was in 1935 for the Law Quarterly Review's
golden jubilees4 or in 1714 when the Register was first published.
31 See Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953); New Jersey Zinc Co. v.
Local 890, International Union of Mine Workers, 57 N.M. 617, 261 P.2d 648 (1953);
Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Wein-
stein v. New York City Transit Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 170, 267 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup.
Ct. 1966); Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority v. Quill, 48 Misc.
2d 1021, 266 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1966); New York City Transit Auathority v. Quill,
48 Misc. 2d 940, 266 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Re Tilco Plastics Ltd. v. Skurjat,
[1966] 2 Ont. 547, 57 D.L.R.2d 596 (1966); Canadian Transp. (U.K.) Ltd. v. Alsbury,
[1952] 6 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 473 (B.C. Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, [1952-1953] 7
West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 49, [1953] 1 D.L.R. 385 (B.C. Ct. App. 1952), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Poje v. Attorney Gen., [1953] 1 Can. Sup. Ct. 516, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 785;
CARROTHERS, A STUDY OF THE OPERATION OF THE INJUNCTION IN LABOUR-MANAGEMENT DIS-
PUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1946-1955 (1956); ONTARIO DEP'T OF LABOUR, REPORT OF A
STUDY ON THE LABOUR INJUNCTION IN ONTARIO (Carrothers ed. 1966).
82 See Stevens, A Brief on Behalf of a Course in Equity, 8 J. LEGAL E .422 (1956).
Compare, however, Sedler, Equitable Relief But Not Equity, 15 J. LEGAL ED. 293
(1963).
33 THE PRAcncAL REGISTER IN CHANCERY V, viii (Wyatt ed. 1800).
8, See supra note 9.
